Chelsea 0-2 Manchester City, Premier League: Tactical Analysis

We certainly have been given plenty to digest from this match, perhaps even more so by the commentary surrounding it. There was no truly inverted fullback, the midfield trio had mixed performances, players were not aligned in positions aligned to their attributes, the forwards continued misfiring, and there were seemingly very few accommodations made to get Cole Palmer, our difference-maker, on the ball. Sure, this litmus test was against the 4-times reigning champions and favourites to lift the Premier League, but to dilute the result by claiming that we were “at the same level or even better” than they were was a bit of balderdash. Pochettino certainly competed “at the same level” against them last season when he drew 1-1 or 4-4, yet here we are,

A true revelation from this match was Romeo Lavia, as the community has rightly pointed out. He was extremely tidy on the ball (completing 46/47 passes), even in tight spaces to help work it forward and break City’s block, and had an overall fantastic defensive performance. In fact, the only more impressive passing feat I’ve noticed was that Christopher Nkunku was a perfect 25/25 on his passes, and it is even more fascinating to note the variety of player or distance to whom he passed. I have high hopes for him.

The duo with whom Lavia was paired cannot honestly say the same, and Enzo Fernández in particular had only moments of brilliance while looking out of sorts being deployed farther up the pitch than he should have been. Moisés Caicedo was neither impressive nor poor, but this system isn’t built for a player like him to shine in the position he was assigned either, and he might be better suited anchoring that midfield much like Lavia did. Lavia was 100% on his long passes (get him into where those passes matter more), while Caicedo was only 20%, and it seems like the expectation would be for the deeper-lying midfielder to make less long, line-breaking passes.

Generating genuine chances and squandering them has been something that has been a consistent issue, even if we somehow finished with a higher xG than they did via some sources – Understat being the exception that I could find where we did not. The fact remains that two out of our three shots on target were taken from outside their box and four of our six shots from inside the box were blocked while the other two sailed far wide. There was a striking similarity to last season in much of how we played – the pressing was actually quite similar (disregarding who was doing it), playing out from the back was a work-in-progress regress, and the commitment of players going forward caused issues at the back if not in only the goals conceded but our comfortability.

Granted, player positions do not tell the whole story. But, taken in context, it can provide a bit of insight as to what may have gone wrong. The necessary context would be that 39% of this game was played in the middle third, 30% of it was played in our defensive third, and 31% in the final third. I mentioned in my left-back article that in preseason we seemed to compact the centre of the pitch – against City there was certainly no exception. Doing this made the game much more open, and therefore without both clinical finishing and defending, our fate was open to the team that could win the middle of the pitch, which they did resoundingly.

Once players are committed forward, possession is of the utmost importance, but we aren’t yet able to play cohesively enough to coalesce that practice. Turning it over means we are in a quick transition to defense with players potentially out of position and spaces all over for their attackers to pick up. The worst part was that City don’t necessarily transition quickly, with 5 midfielders they always had an outlet, so we often bit on a fake passing scenario that opened us up. In a game with nigh 50/50 possession, this setup below is doom or gloom. I have played and coached hockey, and this was how I coached my teams – the middle wins the game.

Almost half (47%) of our attack came down our left flank, but Malo Gusto ended up being more advanced than Marc Cucurella. That imbalance trying to disrupt a team designed for it. In the second half, the floating capacity of Cole Palmer often brought him centrally, but what was most clearly on display was that Maresca has not settled upon his final set-up final XI, but that the crop from which he will choose was settled.

Jackson’s offside goal is another of the deciding factors of this match – individuals stepping up at the right times. In fact, as a unit, we were similar to Man City in passing and did even surpass them in potentially influential things like final third entries. But they won 57% of the ground duels (43/76) and completed 65% (15/23) of their dribbles, 11 of which were in our half. They beat us man to man in both the offensive and defensive phases of the game. In fact, a starker contrast could not exist between our dribbles and carries – Chelsea carried the ball cumulatively 334 times for 1332 yards whereas only 648 of those were progressive. We attempted 9 take-ons and only succeeded in 2, a meagre 22.2%. City carried the ball just a few more times than us (361), but for 2554 yards and 1530 of those were progressive. They also completed 12/20 take-ons.

Additionally, with their four attacking midfielders supported by two defensive midfielders, it is no wonder why our system was overrun. Not only did their numbers overwhelm us, but who was supposed to track the attackers as they drifted wider confused our marking scheme. In particular, Kevin De Bruyne, probably the last person that should be left open, was finding pockets of space both in the left half-space and out wide because he did not have a consistent mark. That certainly contributed to why Enzo is being rated so poorly after this match – in the first half he seemed to be assigned to mark Mateo Kovačic.

Being deployed in the more advanced role limited his impact defensively, but also did not suit his offensive skillset. There were times when he was pressing higher up the pitch than anyone else. Even if he were to nick the ball off someone, he doesn’t have the pace to get to goal, and he is much better suited to picking up a passing lane and putting a through ball in for a faster attacker. He looked significantly more comfortable once being dropped in beside Caicedo (I am NOT saying that Lavia should have been withdrawn), but that coincided with a few other changes that, once City realised what we were doing, they covered responsibly.

On the occasions when Gusto inverted to an extent, specifically at the start of the second half, our ball movement was certainly better, but only because he was counterbalancing what had been already done by City by adding himself into the midfield fray.

Once the substitutions began and the threat and impetus improved while the cohesion that Lavia brought did not, it seemed like the result was already determined. One thing that is striking is in fact how both of their goals were scored – shortly following Chelsea just clearing the ball rather than playing out from the back. Erling Haaland scored his after Malo Gusto cleared the ball back straight to Ederson and they brought it back forward to score after the next touches in our box. Mateo Kovačić scored after Wesley Fofana had cleared the ball straight to him in midfield. Perhaps since that is not something Maresca is doing in training, we were unprepared for it come actual matchplay, but that might prove a problem against Wolves too, if not properly address it.

Maresca said post-match that this would be a 5 to 10 year project and that nobody at the club has indicated either that Champions League was the bare minimum or that his managerial time scale would be affected barring results. It remains unclear whether or not he is authorising the transfers that are occurring or even the level of communication between him and the higher-ups, because that does not sound consistent with their expectations. Either way, take that match with a grain of salt – there are bound to be growing pains, we did establish ourselves well offensively if not to finish our chances, and it was against one of the best teams in the world.